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CASE NOTES
interest of the beneficiary is treated by the courts as personal property for
all purposes. 4 This conversion of interest from realty to personaltv is
based on the doctrine of equitable conversion.5
Under the land trust the beneficiary is able to deal with real property
as personal property,( but he cannot directly affect the legal title. There-
fore, to sell he must act through the trustee. In the instant case, Harmon,
the beneficiary, did not just attempt to assign or transfer his personal
property interest-he tried to sell the land itself. In doing so, however, he
learned the legal lesson of which all land trust beneficiaries might take
note-namely, that while practically speaking he had complete control of
the property, including the power to compel the trustee to convey, he
could not directly convey the legal title himself. He had to act through
the trustee, who had both legal and equitable title.
4 2 Gordan v. Gordan, 6 I11. 2d 572, 129 N.E. 2d 706 (1955) Dicus v. Scherer, 277 111.
168, 115 N.E. 171 (1917).
5 Baker v. Commissioner, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 (1925).
6 For a discussion of the legal benefits of holding the property as personal property
see CAPLAN, THE LAW OF THE LAND TRusrs 12-18 (2d ed. 1958).
CORPORATIONS-BURDEN OF PROOF ON DIRECTORS TO
SHOW FAIRNESS OF TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
CORPORATIONS WITH COMMON DIRECTORS
The plaintiffs, minority stockholders of a building corporation, brought
suit on behalf of themselves and all the other stockholders to require the
directors of the South Parkway Building Corporation to account to the
corporation for damages allegedly suffered by various transactions be-
tween the South Parkway Building Corporation and the Union Amuse-
ment Company, the two corporations having interlocking directorates
with both boards of directors dominated by one individual. The chancel-
lor ordered defendants, as directors of the corporation, to give an ac-
counting for the benefit of the stockholders. The appellate court reversed
the chancellor's decree, but the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the
appellate court on the basis that the appellate court had erred in constru-
ing Illinois law as placing upon stockholders the burden of establishing
actual fraud in transactions between corporations with interlocking di-
rectorates. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Il1. 2d 268, 166
N.E. 2d 793 (1960).
This case required a clarification of Illinois law respecting the obliga-
tion of corporate directorates. The plaintiff stockholders claimed, and the
Supreme Court ultimately held, as above indicated, that the appellate
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
court1 had erred in construing Illinois law as placing upon the stockhold-
ers the burden of establishing actual fraud in transactions between cor-
porations with interlocking directorates. The defendants contended that
the appellate court properly reversed the decree of the chancellor on the
ground that his findings and order were based upon an erroneous concept
of law, whereby transactions between corporations with some common
directors were conclusively fraudulent. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
clarifying the law of the state, had to protect stockholders from exploita-
tion by directors, and at the same time avoid undue restriction on cor-
porate activity.2
Historically, the burden of proof in fraud, in the case of those not oc-
cupying a fiduciary relationship, is on the one asserting the fraud. 3 How-
ever, a fiduciary dealing with his beneficiaries is measured by a different
standard. He cannot benefit by dealing with them to their disadvantage. 4
Corporate directors and the officers of a corporation have been recog-
nized as being in a fiduciary relationship to the stockholders, in their cor-
porate dealings. It is their duty to administer the corporate affairs for the
common benefit of all the stockholders and to exercise their best care,
skill and judgment in the management of the corporate business solely in
the interest of the corporation. 5
In early cases a director's role was identified with that of a trustee. Be-
cause he was to act solely in the interest of the corporation as cestui que
trust, contracts between a director and his corporation were voidable at
the option of the corporation. 6 The increasing complexity of corporate
dealings showed the inadequacy of this doctrine and contracts were al-
lowed to stand if the court found that they were fair,7 and the burden of
proving fairness fell on the one who would maintain the contract.8
The conflict in the instant case grew out of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in White v. Stevens.9 The court recognized that corpora-
' Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 21111. App. 2d 538, 159 N.E. 2d 31 (1959).
2 For discussion of use of the fairness test see Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1948).
3 Racine Fuel Co. v. Rawlins, 377 111. 375, 36 N.E. 2d 710 (1941); Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Genova, 90 F. 2d 874 (6th Cir. 1937); Barrett v. Shanks, 382 I11. 434, 47 N.E. 2d
481 (1943).
4 Farwell v. Pyle-National Elec. Headlight Co., 289 111. 157, 124 N.E. 449 (1919).
5 Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927); Winger v. Chicago
City Bank & Trust Co., 394 M. 94,67 N.E. 2d 265 (1946); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S.
204 (1945).
6 Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287, 54 N.E. 17 (1899).
7Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875).
S Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
9 326 111. 528, 158 N.E. 101 (1927).
CASE NOTES
tions having directors in common may contract with each other if the
contracts were fair and reasonable, but emphasized that such transactions
would be carefully scrutinized. In the course of the opinion the court
mentioned, by way of dictum and without any citation of authority, that
in contracts between corporations having one or more common directors
"there is no presumption... that the contract is unfair or oppressive, but
the person attacking it must prove its unfairness."'10 The defendants in the
instant case relied upon this dictum of the White case, but it has not been
followed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in any case since then."
In the same year as the White decision, and in the same court, Dixmoor
Golf Club v. Evans12 was decided. The defendant in this case bought land
for the purpose of selling it to the corporation, and did so sell it at an
excess of the cost to him. The court held that since the board of directors
was dominated by one member, and since it had purchased land from him
for the corporation, although the corporation had use for the land, the
profit derived from it by the director had to be returned to the corpora-
tion. The reasoning of the court was that the corporation had not been
represented by disinterested directors, and a director, in his capacity as
such, must always act for the benefit of the corporation. In effect there-
fore, by depriving the director of his profit the court allowed the cor-
poration the benefit of the director's purchase of the land. The fact that
the profit accrued to the director was sufficient for the return of the profit
to the corporation. The burden of proving fairness of the transaction was
not discussed. The Dixmoor case therefore, laid down a rule requiring
much closer scrutiny of a single dominating director's corporate affairs
than was indicated in the White case.
In Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co.'3 the court was con-
fronted with a situation where the directors dealt with a company in
which they had complete ownership. Disaffirmance of the contract was
allowed. After citing Dixmoor the court said: "The fact that they [the
directors] ostensibly deal with another corporation and transfer the prop-
erty to it will not change the effect of the transaction .... -114 The court
went on to say that even if only one of the directors voting for the trans-
1Old. at 533, 158 N.E. at 103. (Emphasis added.) In this case the court held the
contracts to be fair and reasonable, and the question of the burden of proof was not
in issue. Therefore, the statement placing the burden of proof on the one attacking the
contracts was, as mentioned in the text, merely dictum.
11 The White case was cited by the appellate court in Nagel v. Northern I11. Gas Co.,
12 11. App. 2d 413, 139 N.E. 2d 810 (1957). No authority other than the White case
was cited in support of the proposition. Nagel is the only decision on the appellate
level in accord with the White case.
12 3 2 5 111. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927).
13 394 I11. 94,67 N.E. 2d 265 (1946). 14 Id. at 109, 67 N.E. 2d at 276.
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action profited thereby, and his vote was necessary, the transaction would
be tainted with the same illegality and fraud as though they were all in-
terested.
In the instant case there was a situation of a controlling group common
to both corporations-i.e., interlocking directorates. A situation of this
sort was resolved in the leading case of Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Min-
ing Co.15 The Geddes court stated the rule as follows:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature that
transactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously
by the law as are personal dealings between a director and his corporation, and
where the fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those
who would maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale is in-
volved, the full adequacy of the consideration. Especially is this true where a
common director is dominating in influence or in character. This court has
been consistently emphatic in the application of this rule, which, it has declared,
is founded in soundest morality, and we now add in the soundest business
policy. 16
It must be noted that the instant case adopted the rule of the Geddes
case, and thus established it as the law in Illinois regarding the burden of
proof in cases involving interlocking directorates. The wording of the
Geddes rule is exactly contra to the dictum in the White case. However,
the practical effect of the Illinois Court's adoption of Geddes is not to
eradicate White. Since the Geddes rule is applied where a director or di-
rectors have excessive control over two corporations, the dictum in the
White case might be adopted where a single director, not dominating in
influence, is common to two corporations.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in deciding Sblensky according to the
principles of the Geddes and Winger cases not only has followed the
trend of protecting shareholders from exploitation, but also has provided
corporations with freedom in their dealings on the assumption that hon-
est dealings will be proven fair if challenged. This is entirely sensible and
even necessary in view of the increasing complexity of corporate affairs
and the growth of interlocking directorates.
15 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
16 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921). (Emphasis
added.)
CRIMINAL LAW-POLICE OFFICER HELD GUILTY OF
OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT FOR SOLICITING THEFT
Defendant, a police officer, was convicted of misconduct in office due
to his solicitation of others to steal parking meter receipts. The appellate
